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WHAT CONTRACTS TO GIVE A TRUST RECEIPT ARE
EQUIVALENT TO TRUST RECEIPTS?
DWIGHT A. POMEROY*
When attempting to ascertain what contracts to give a trust receipt
have been made by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act' equivalent in all re-
spects to trust receipts, one finds the terms of section 4(I) somewhat ob-
scure, giving the impression that with respect to this question the statute
needs clarification. As it stafids, section 4(I) of the act appearsto make
some, but not all, contracts to give a trust receipt, which are part of trust
receipt transactions, equivalent in all respects to trust receipts.
If the subsection is intended to specify certain contracts to give a trust
receipt which may be part of trust receipt transactions, and to make them,
but not the others, equivalent in all respects to trust receipts, then, of
course, the subsection'may be open to no criticism other than as to the
wisdom of so doing. If, on the other hand, the subsection is intended to
make all contracts to give a trust receipt, which are part of trust receipt
transactions, equivalent in all respects to trust receipts, one may well
question whether its object will be realized under the terms of the act.
Section 4(I) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act provides:
i. A contract to give a trust receipt, if in writing and signed by the trustee, shall,
with reference to; goods, documents or instruments thereafter delivered by the entrust-
er to the trustee in reliance on such contract, be equivalent in all respects to a trust
receipt.
If this subsection is intended to make all contracts to give a trust re-
ceipt, which are part of trust receipt transactions as provided in section 2
of the act, equivalent in all respects to trust receipts, it seems that the
terms of the subsection are not consistent with such purpose. In the first
place, the subsection does not appear to apply to contracts to give a trust
receipt made in connection with trust receipt transactions which may arise
under the circumstances described in section 2(I)(b) of the act.
Section 2 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in part provides:
* Professor of Law, University of Utah.
19 U.L.A. 665.
COMMENT AND CASE NOTES
i. A trust receipt transaction within the meaning of this act is any transaction to
which an entruster and a trustee are parties, for one of the purposes set forth in Sub-
section 3, whereby
(a) the entruster or any third person delivers to the trustee goods, documents or in-
struments in which the entruster (i) prior to the transaction has, or for new value (ii)
by the transaction acquires or (iii) as the result thereof is to acquire promptly, a se-
curity interest; or
(b) the entruster gives new value in reliance upon the transfer by the trustee to such
entruster of a security interest in instruments or documents2 which are actually ex-
hibited to such entruster, or to his agent in that behalf, at a place of business of either
eqtruster or agent, but possession of which is retained by the trustee;
provided that the delivery under paragraph (a) or the giving of new value under
paragraph (b) either
(i) [be against a trust receipt], or
(ii) be pursuant to a prior or concurrent written and signed agreement of the
trustee to give such a writing.
According to section 2(1) (b), a contract to give a trust receipt may be
part of a trust receipt transaction when the trustee has and retains posses-
sion of the instruments or documents, which are merely exhibited to the
entruster, or to his agent in that behalf. Yet, under the terms of section
4(l), it appears that a contract to give a trust receipt shall be equivalent in
all respects to a trust receipt only when it is made with reference to goods,
documents, or instruments "delivered by the entruster to the trustee."
Therefore, under such an interpretation, contracts to give a trust receipt
which are part of trust receipt transactions involving circumstances de-
scribed in section 2(i)(b), are not, under the terms of section 4(I), made
equivalent in all respects to trust receipts.
It might be contended that the circumstances described in section 2(I)-
(b), out of which trust receipt transactions may arise, constitute in effect
a pledge of the instruments or documents by the trustee, and a surrender
of the pledged instruments or documents by the entruster to the trustee;
and that the statute has merely eliminated, as needless acts, certain steps
in ihe procedure. Under such an assumption, the surrender of the instru-
ments or documents by the pledgee could be deemed a delivery of the in-
struments or documents by the entruster to the trustee, thereby meeting
the requirements of section 4(l). If, however, such an interpretation is
necessary in order that all contracts to give a trust receipt which are part
of trust receipt transactions will be deemed equivalent in all respects to
trust receipts, the need for clarification is at once obvious, for it not only
calls unnecessarily for an interpretation of doubtful validity, but endan-
It is immaterial for the purpose of this discussion whether, as here, the suggestion of the
draftsman has been followed as to inserting "or documents."
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gers uniformity of decisions, particularly in view of the fact that lack of de-
livery of the instruments or d6cuments by the entruster to the trustee
seems to be emphasized in section 2 of the act.
If section 4(1) is not intended to apply to contracts to give a trust re-
ceipt made in connection with trust receipt transactions under circuin-
stances set forth in section 2(I) (b), but is intended to apply only to such
contracts made in connection with trust receipt transactions under cir-
cumstances set'forth in section 2 () (a), it seems that the terms of the'sub-
section are even inconsistent with this limited purpose. It appears that
section 4(1) makes some of the contracts to give a trust receipt, but not
all, which are part of trust receipt transactions as described in section
2(I)(a), equivalent in all respects to trust receipts.
According to Section 2(1) (a), contracts to give a trust receipt may be
part of trust receipt transactions when goods, documents, or instruments
are delivered by "the entruster or any third person": to the trustee. Yet,
under the terms of section 4(I), it appears that contracts to give a trust
receipt are deemed equivalent in all respects to trust receipts only when
they are with reference to goods, documents, or instruments "delivered by
the entruster to the trustee." Therefore, under such an interpretation, con-
tracts to give a trust receipt which are part of trust receipt transactions
when, as provided in section 2(1) (a), goods, documents, or. instruments
are delivered by a third person to the trustee, are not, under the terms of
section 4(I),. made equivalent in all respects to trust receipts.
-If section 4(1) is not intended to apply to contracts to give a trust re-
ceipt which are part of trust receipt transactions when made in connection
with circumstances described in section 2(I)(b) and when made in con-
nection with a delivery of goods, documents, or instruments by a third
person to the trustee, as described in section 2 () (a), but is intended to ap-
ply only to such contracts when, under section 2 (1) (a), a delivery of goods,
documents, or instruments is made by ihe entruster to the trustee, it seems
that the terms of *the subsection are even inconsistent with this more
limited purpose. It appears that section 4(1) makes some of the contracts
to give a trust receipt, but not all, which are made when, under section
2(1) (a), there is a delivery by the entruster to the trustee, equivalent in
all respects to trust receipts.
, According to section 2(1) (b)(ii), a trust receipt transaction may arise,
provided the delivery described in section 2(1) (a) be "pursuant to a prior
or concurrent written and signed agreement of the trustee." Yet, under the
terms of section 4(), it appears that contracts to give a trust receipt
shall be equivalent in all respects to trust receipts only "with reference to
goods, documents or instruments thereafter delivered by the entruster to
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the trustee." Therefore, under such an interpretation, contracts to give a'
trust receipt made concurrently with the delivery of goods, documents, or
instruments by the entruster to the trustee, are not, under the terms of sec-
tion 4(I), made equivalent in all respects to trust receipts.
Both Illinois 3 and Indiana4 have made alterations in the phraseology
of section 4(I) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. These changes do not,
however, clarify the meaning of the subsection with respect to the points
here raised. It seems that they are also open to the objections that they
make contracts to give a trust receipt equivalent in all respects to trust
receipts, when they are with reference to goods in the trustee's possession,
which apparently includes "old possession," as distinguished from "new
possession," with which the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is presumed to
be concerned.
If section 4(I) is intended to make all cohtracts to give a trust receipt
which are part of trust receipt transactions as provided in section 2,
equivalent in all respects to trust receipts, it seems that the subsection
should read:
. A contract to give a trust receipt, if in writing and signed by the trustee, shall,
with reference to goods, documents or instruments concurrently or thereafter delivered
by the entruster or any third person to the trustee, or with reference to instruments or
documents exhibited to the entruster, or to his agent in that behalf, who gives new value to
the trustee, in reliance on such contract, be equivalent in all respects to a trust receipt.
It would be much better, however, if section 4() were changed to read
simply and clearly as follows:
i. A contract to give a trust receipt, if made as part of a trust receipt transaction as
described in Section 2, shall, with reference to such goods, documents or instruments,
be equivalent, in all respects to a trust receipt.
If section 4() is not intended to apply to contracts to give a trust re-
ceipt which are part of trust receipt transactions under circumstances de-
scribed in section 2(1) (b), it seems that the subsection should be changed
to read:
i. A contract to give a trust receipt, if in writing and signed by the trustee, shall,
with reference to goods, documents or instruments concurrently or thereafter delivered
by the entruster or any third person to the trustee in reliance on such contract, be equiv-
alent in all respects to a trust receipt.
Here, also, it would be much better if section 4(I) were changed to read
simply and clearly as follows:
i. A contract to give a trust receipt, if made as part of a trust receipt transaction
under circumstances described in section 2(X)(a), shall, with reference to such goods,
documents or instruments, be equivalent in all respects to a trust receipt.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943)
,
c. 121J, § 169. 4 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burms, 1933), § 5i-6o4•
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If, in addition to the foregoing limitation, section 4(I) is intehded to
impose two other limitations on contracts to give a trust receipt deemed
to be equivalent in all respects to trust receipts, by making a distinction
between the entruster and a third person with respect to delivery of goods,
documents, or instruments, and, by making a distinction between prior
and concurrent contracts to give a trust receipt, which are part of trust re-
ceipt transactions, the terms of the subsection seem to be consistent with
sucht purpose. Yet, there may be courts who, seeing no reason for making
some, but not all, contracts to give a trust receipt, which are part of trust
receipt transactions as !prescribed by section 2, equivalent in all respects
to trust receipts, will interpret the subsection contrary to this assumed ob-
ject. Therefore, in order to avoid lack of uniformity of decisions; it would
perhaps be better if a word or phrase be inserted to indicate that the -limi-
tations were not unintentional. For example, the insertion of "only" be-
fore "with" in section 4(I) might be sufficient to make it clearthat the
three apparent limitations in the subsection were not the result of inad-
vertence or oversight.
